Despite the extensive work on currency mismatches, research investigating the significance of maturity mismatches in emerging market economies is scarce. In particular, how capital flows affect maturity mismatches, and the significance of these mismatches for financial health during crisis and non-crisis periods have not been investigated as thoroughly. In this paper, I show that emerging market banks' maturity mismatches are positively related to capital flows and that maturity mismatches play a key role in determining external vulnerability. Specifically, using bank level data, I find that maturity mismatches significantly increase during periods of high capital inflows, and banks with high maturity mismatches report larger losses if there is a capital reversal --despite being more profitable in more tranquil periods --. Finally, I also propose a simple partial equilibrium framework that is convenient for analyzing the effects of maturity mismatches.
INTRODUCTION
Following the emerging market crises of the past 15 years, and the role banks played in determining the severity of these crisis episodes, emerging market economies have adopted regulatory frameworks to minimize the risks associated with banks' balance sheets. These regulations have had some positive effects. Indeed, in contrast to previous episodes of financial turbulence, these countries have initially shown more resiliency during the current global financial crisis, in part due to sound risk management. 1 Nevertheless, the decline in capital inflows prompted by the concerns about the global outlook has revealed that balance sheet vulnerabilities are still a major issue. 2 Two of the most cited fragilities in balance sheets are currency and maturity mismatches. After the crisis episodes of the past 15 years, a myriad of empirical and theoretical research has studied the vulnerability of banks with excessive short term foreign currency denominated debt to capital reversals. Research on the role and determinants of maturity mismatches, however, is scarce at this point. This paper's goal is to fill this gap by studying the effects of international capital flows on the maturity structure of banks in emerging markets, and the profitability implications of maturity mismatches during crisis and non-crisis periods using bank level data. The role of maturity mismatches during crisis periods has been analyzed extensively. The effects and determinants of maturity mismatches during non-crisis periods, however, is a significant innovation of this paper. Studying maturity mismatches during non-crisis periods is especially important since it helps us uncover the dynamics governing a major fragility (severe maturity mismatches) in financial markets during tranquil times. Understanding the dynamics of maturity mismatches during non-crisis periods would especially help in designing policies that would prevent or minimize the consequences of financial crises. To uncover these dynamics, using bank level data instead of the common practice of using macroeconomic data helps one identify the determinants of maturity mismatches that are independent of bank characteristics.
My empirical analysis yields three notable results. First, there is a positive relationship between capital flows and maturity mismatches in the absence of a crisis. Second, the degree of maturity mismatches prior to a financial crisis is negatively related to banks' profitability after the crisis episode; in the absence of a crisis, however, banks with high maturity mismatches outperform banks with low maturity mismatches. Third, I find that banks lack liquidity, and shift towards short term finance during periods of high price volatility, and therefore cannot, or choose not to, protect themselves against price volatility.
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This paper is related to the literature that investigates the effects and determinants of balance sheet fragilities. This literature can be roughly categorized into three groups: 1) Empirical studies using macroeconomic data. 2) Empirical studies using firm level data. 3) Theoretical studies.
In the first strand of the literature, researchers (c.f. Calvo and Mendoza, 1996; and Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini, 1999) generally identify the channeling of cheap short term borrowings into long term risky credit under implicit guarantees as the source of maturity mismatches prompted by capital inflows. Others (c.f. Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, Levine and Maksimovic, 2000; Buch, Lusinyan, 2003; Bussiere, Fratzscher and Koeniger, 2004; Caballero and Krishnamurty, 2003; Demirguc and Detragiache, 1998; Fan, Titman and Twite, 2005) blame the prevalence of short term external finance on insufficient financial development, the reluctance of foreign creditors to offer long term funds, and currency mismatches. The positive relationship I find between capital flows and maturity mismatches in this paper is consistent with the predictions of this strand of literature. The empirical studies listed above use macroeconomic data to study the interaction of maturity mismatches with currency mismatches, institutional quality, and growth in the aftermath of crisis episodes. In this paper, I emphasize the relationship between maturity mismatches and capital flows and use bank level data. Furthermore, I investigate non-crisis periods as well as crisis periods in order to understand the evolution of financial fragilities prior to a crisis episode.
In the second strand of the literature, a widely-studied subject is the effect of balance sheet vulnerabilities on firm's profit and investment decisions. Although, there is a common agreement that it is possible for maturity mismatches to affect profitability, risks and investment decisions, evidence from studies measuring the quantitative significance of balance sheet fragilities for firms' performance and decisions is mixed at best. On one hand, studies such as Bleakley and Cowen (2005) , de la Torre and Schmukler (2004) find that there is a negligible effect of maturity mismatches on profitability and investment decisions. On the other hand, authors such as Aguiar (2005) , Chang and Velasco (1999) , Iannariello, Morsy and Terada-Hagiwara (2007) , Radelet and Sachs (1998) find that weak balance sheets have a significant effect on firm-level investment or that unanticipated interest fluctuations can affect profitability negatively. The relationship I find between profitability and maturity mismatches implies that banks are unable to cover liquidity shortages cheaply and the benefits of staying liquid prior to a crisis period outweigh the benefits from using this extra liquidity to increase revenue. However, in the absence of crises, banks with high maturity mismatches are more profitable. The analysis in this paper is different from the studies mentioned above in three ways. First the emphasis is on banks instead of nonfinancial firms. Second, noncrisis periods are analyzed separately from crisis periods to capture the different dynamics governing these periods. Finally, I measure the unique effects of maturity mismatches --not directly related to exchange rate depreciations --on profitability. I choose to use banking sector data in my analysis for two reasons. First, there is ample evidence dating back to Fisher (1933) and Keynes (1936) supporting the view that bank balance sheet fragilities amplify the severity of financial crises. Second, I find evidence that banks in emerging markets have significantly higher maturity mismatches in their balance sheets compared to nonfinancial firms. This evidence is discussed in the next section.
In this paper, I use balance sheet data from 214 banks in 18 emerging market economies and different variables to proxy capital flows, maturity mismatches, profitability and price volatility. This data set and the estimation strategy followed (General Method of Moments strategy of Arellano and Bover, 1995) provides several advantages over analyses that use aggregate data. Specifically, using this methodology, I am able to account for bank specific variables, to generate more degrees of freedom and reduce causality concerns stemming from the endogenous right hand side variables.
Ideally, one would attempt to compare the empirical results mentioned above with the predictions of a calibrated general equilibrium model. However, conventional general equilibrium frameworks have not been successful at replicating the effects of capital reversals on an economy. 4 Indeed, different degrees of approximation used to solve these models are agreed to be incapable of capturing the effects of large shocks economies face during financial crises. Therefore, theoretical studies (the third strand of the literature mentioned above) have generally relied on various variations of partial equilibrium, bank-run models by Bryant (1980) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983) to study the effects of capital reversals. Nevertheless, interaction of maturity mismatches and capital flows has not been investigated in these models. At the end of this paper, I propose a framework that is convenient for analyzing the effects of maturity mismatches. Specifically, I extend the bank-run model of Chang and Velasco (2001) by introducing maturity mismatches and profits to study the interaction of these variables with capital flows. 5 The optimality conditions of the model reveal the following: Short term inflows increase maturity mismatches. The effect of long term inflows, however, is ambiguous as they increase short term liabilities through wealth effects, but also provide long term funds that can be liquidated in the event of a crisis. Finally, consistent with the empirical results, there is a positive relationship between maturity mismatches and losses incurred after a crisis.
Overall, this paper contributes to the three strands of literature mentioned above by analyzing the role and effects of maturity mismatches that are independent of currency mismatches and by also considering non-crisis periods. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data utilized and some preliminary findings that provide motivation for the rest of the paper. Section 3 studies the relationship between capital flows and maturity mismatches, gauges the effects of maturity mismatches on economic performance for emerging market banks and measures the effect of price volatility on maturity mismatches. Section 4 proposes a partial equilibrium model to study maturity mismatches. Section 5 concludes.
DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
The panel data set includes 214 publicly traded depository institutions from 18 emerging market economies. Annual data from 1990 to 2004 are employed in the analysis. The International Financial Statistics (IFS) database provides macroeconomic and financial sector data, (which are utilized as control variables) capital flow data, and price volatility measures. Balance sheet data, and profitability, debt management and asset management ratios are obtained from the Mergentonline database. These variables are defined in Appendix A.
It is important to point out that the types of profitability and maturity mismatch ratios that were reported varied considerably from bank to bank. Therefore, I used various ratios as a proxy for profitability and maturity mismatches to check robustness in the next section. In this section, for brevity, I use the two widely-used liquidity measures: quick ratio and the current ratio as well as the widely-used debt structure ratio: ratio of short term debt to total debt to measure the degree of maturity mismatches, and the two common measures of profitability: Return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) to measure profitability. Since companies that are illiquid would be incapable of paying their maturing short term debt and there would be an increase the amount of short term debt to total debt due to debt rollover, throughout the paper, maturity mismatches, with a slight abuse of notation, refers to both liquidity variables as well as debt structure variables.
A preliminary analysis of the banking sector debt structure in emerging markets reveals three important observations. 6 First, short term debt to total debt ratios are lower compared to those in advanced economies. This evidence is consistent with the argument that the presence of deeper financial markets lowers the risks associated with liquidity shortages. Furthermore, banking sector ratios are in general higher than the corporate sector ratios.
7 Second, the higher levels of short term debt accumulated prior to the crisis decreases afterwards.
8 This observation supports the view that relatively unstable capital flows are mostly in the form of short term debt. This positive relationship between capital flows and short term debt ratios can be seen more clearly in Figures 1 and 2 . This observation holds for the group of emerging market economies as a whole as well. Among the possible determinants of this positive correlation are country specific factors like cronyism and premature financial sector deregulation. Nevertheless, the surge in emerging market capital inflows in the form of short term debt in 2003 and 2004 partially reflects the low yields in industrialized economies and the resulting search for yield. Therefore, I include U.S. interest rates in the group of capital flow proxies. Finally, there is also evidence that maturity mismatches are more significant in the financial sector.
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This in turn emphasizes the importance of analyzing this sector.
Provided that the proportion of short term assets are constant, evidence above suggests that there may be a positive relationship between capital inflows and maturity mismatches even in the absence of a crisis. Assuming that this relationship holds, and banks receiving higher capital inflows carry less liquidity, I investigate the effect of maturity mismatches on financial sector performance after and in the absence of a financial crisis. A simple comparison of the profitability of banks with different maturity structures provides motivation for the empirical analysis to follow. 11 The main conclusions that can be drawn from the summary statistics are the following. On one hand, banks with low maturity mismatches have performed better in terms of profitability one year after the crisis compared to banks with high maturity mismatches in general. However, cross country comparisons show mixed results. For example, while banks with high maturity mismatches in Brazil outperform banks with low maturity mismatches in Malaysia, they are dominated by Brazil's own low maturity mismatch banks. On the other hand, the disparity between the two groups' performance measures seems to disappear starting with the second year after the crisis; possibly pointing to the higher profitability of banks that channel their relatively higher short term debts into long term assets in the absence of a crisis. Finally, banks with lower maturity mismatches are on average bigger in terms of assets compared to the other group. Therefore, accounting for bank size may capture the idiosyncratic effects of maturity mismatches. Given this preliminary evidence, a natural question to ask is: To what degree do banks protect themselves against interest rate and exchange rate risks? More specifically, do the banks of countries with high price volatilities choose to hold more precautionary liquid assets, and limit their maturity mismatches? A synopsis of the data shows mixed results.
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CAPITAL FLOWS, MATURITY MISMATCHES AND PROFITABILITY
Relationship between Capital Flows and Maturity Mismatches
Motivated by the partial evidence reported in the previous section, I investigate whether depository institution balance sheets exhibit more (less) maturity mismatches when capital inflows increase (decrease) in the absence of a crisis. I use the Kaminsky (2006) classification to identify crisis periods, and exclude them from the dataset. Next, I estimate a fixed effects panel model using the GMM strategy of Arrelano and Bover (1995) . This methodology is superior to OLS when the dependent variable is not stationary, there are unobserved firm specific effects, and there is reverse causality. Accordingly, I estimate the following model: e are the proxies for capital inflows, country specific control variables, time dummies and the error term respectively. Country and firm fixed effects are included to control for unobserved heterogeneity. The latter also controls for attrition bias due to non-random exit. I use the second and third lags of the predetermined variables as instruments. Sargan-Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions assesses the validity of these instruments. Significance tests are conducted using robust standard errors that are adjusted for inter-firm and inter-country correlation.
Banks listed in the stock exchanges were significantly larger than the rest of the firms in the economy. Nevertheless, there was considerable difference between small banks and large banks in terms of their assets, debt structure and liquidity. 13 Furthermore, it is well documented that larger banks which have greater access to foreign funds and are deemed too big to fail exhibit stronger maturity mismatches during capital inflows. Therefore I control for firms' size in the regressions. The size variable, ij Size is generated as follows: I calculate a firm's total assets as a percentage of total assets off all the firms --in the dataset --in the country for each year and average this variable over the sample period. Furthermore, the interaction of capital flows and the size variable is included to capture the asymmetric effects of capital flows on banks with different sizes.
I also considered several other variables to control for certain firm characteristics such as average profitability, debt structure and asset management. Out of these, only debt structure variables had a notable effect on the estimation results. The debt structure variable, ij DS is generated by dividing a firm's average Short-term Debt/Total Debt ratio in the sample period by the average aggregate Short-term Debt/Total Debt ratio in the country.
There are two characteristics of the country specific control variables that are problematic. Most of the data is reported in local currency units, and there are significant discrepancies in the inflation rates of these countries. To deal with these complications, independent variables are divided by GDP or converted to real dollar values using the CPI and the GDP deflators. While the former method emphasizes financially open economies, the latter method gives more weight to the banks of relatively large countries. Nevertheless, I only report the results obtained from by GDP ratios since the other two methods produced similar results.
I use different proxies for maturity mismatches and capital inflows in the simulations to check for robustness. These variables are defined in Appendix A. In addition to the two widely used proxies for capital inflows: the 3 month U.S. Tbill interest rates and the net central bank foreign currency reserves, I distinguish between equity and debt flows, consider capital flows that affect the balances sheets of the banking sector directly, and include the net direct investment position of the economy. 14 The latter variable was added to test for the dampening effect it has on capital flight, and to test whether its effects on banking sector financial health is different from the other measures of capital flows. 15 The choice of maturity mismatch proxies was determined by data availability. Table 2 summarizes the results. Each coefficient value along with its standard error are obtained from a regression of the dependent variables listed in row 1 on the independent variables listed in column 1, and other control variables. Majority of the significant coefficients' signs corresponding to columns 2 through 5 in Table 2 , which represent the strength of the banks in meeting their short term obligations are negative. Thus, capital inflows (outflows) lead to a disproportionate increase (decrease) in current liabilities compared to current assets, when I control for country and time fixed effects along with other macroeconomic and firm specific variables. Similarly, positive significant coefficients reported under columns 6 and 7, and the negative significant coefficients in column 8 imply that banking sector debt maturity structure switches from long term to short term as capital flows into the country. The fewer number of significant coefficients under columns 6 to 8 partially reflects the fewer number of reported debt structure variables. The size of the coefficients also indicates that the effect of the capital flow variables on banking sector balance sheets is not insignificant. For instance, a 100 basis point increase in U.S. Tbills leads to a 4.53 percent drop in the quick ratio. 16 Most of the significant coefficients were recorded in the regressions using the quick and the current ratios as proxies, coefficients estimated for the direct investment and BOP net equity liabilities variables were insignificant. The relatively greater importance of BOP net debt liabilities in affecting maturity mismatches compared to equity liabilities partially reflects the independence of bank balance sheets from private sector equity borrowing, and the exposure of domestic banks to the extra amount of debt. The insignificance of direct investment coefficients is in line with the dampening effect hypothesis.
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The first row of Table 1 summarizes these results, and shows that all of the significant coefficients except one point to a positive relationship between maturity mismatches and capital inflows. The coefficients of the firm specific and country specific control variables were similar when different capital inflow proxies were used. Hence, I only report details of the estimation results for one of the capital inflow proxies in Table  3 . The table presents the estimation results obtained by using various bank-level, maturity mismatch measures as dependent variables and country and firm specific independent variables listed in column 1. Central bank foreign currency reserves/GDP variable is used as the proxy for capital inflows/outflows. Results show that a majority of the country specific control variable coefficients have the expected effects on banks' maturity mismatches. The positive and the negative coefficients of lending rates and inflation respectively point to a positive real interest rate, maturity mismatch relationship. More specifically, the drop in current assets due to the increasing opportunity costs, and the shortage of long term funding accompanied by rising real interest rates causes stronger maturity mismatches. GDP growth and current account surpluses are negatively related to maturity mismatches which signals the ability and the choice of banks to switch from short term obligations to long term obligations as macroeconomic conditions improve. Conflicting with the above argument, I find that budget deficits in a majority of the cases affect maturity mismatches positively. This is plausible if we consider that banks' current assets increase as some of the short term debt instruments issued by the government are held by these banks. Consistent with Rodrik and Velasco (1999) , I find that a rise in the M2/GDP ratio increases the degree of maturity mismatches pointing to the lower costs associated with carrying mismatches in financially developed markets. The coefficient of the size and interactive variable imply that larger banks carry higher maturity mismatches and that capital inflows generated larger maturity mismatches in these banks' balance sheets. The test statitics at the bottom of the table report the p-values. Sargan-Hansen test shows that the choice of instruments is valid. Specification tests also fail to find evidence of first and second serial correlation in the error term.
Profitability Comparison for Banks with Different Maturity Mismatches
A buildup of fragility in balance sheets following capital inflows would not be a concern if banks were able to cover their liquidity shortages relatively cheaper and faster. Under this scenario, banks that carry less liquidity could profit more even during capital outflows. Otherwise, liquidity shortages may increase losses during capital reversals. To measure the effect of the escalating financial fragilities prior to the crisis on post-crisis banking sector performance, I compare the profitability of banks with different maturity structures. Furthermore, I run a similar experiment using non-crisis periods only to investigate whether banks benefit from higher leverage when there is financial stability. I use the GMM strategy described above to estimate:
where ijt  represents the different proxies used to measure profitability. Equation (2) is initially estimated using the whole sample period to determine the overall effect of maturity mismatches on profitability. Next, the relationship between maturity mismatches before a financial crisis and profitability afterwards is measured by omitting time periods of countries that are not included in the Kaminsky (2006) crisis classification. Finally, the same experiment is conducted by excluding crisis periods. A total of 49 regressions are run that correspond to the 7 profitability and 7 maturity mismatch variables. Similar to the previous section, I consider five other profitability measures in addition to the widely used return on assets and return on equity ratios due to data limitations and to check robustness. The definitions of these variables are provided in Appendix A.
Results from the regression model using the quick ratio and the whole sample period are reported in Table 4 . Initial observation is that all of the quick ratio coefficients are positive, and 4 out of 7 are significant at 1 percent. 18 The insignificance of Rate of Return on Investment (ROI) and Operating Margin (OM) can be due to the insufficient number of observations. Positive coefficients imply that higher liquidity implies higher profitability. I included log differences of the exchange rates to account for the contribution of currency mismatches to maturity mismatches. 19 The positive coefficients of the liquidity variables add to the findings of Bussiere, Fratzscher and Koeniger (2004) , and show that maturity mismatches that are not necessarily due to currency mismatches also have a significant effect on profitability. When we consider the other control variable coefficients, we observe that deposit bank net foreign liabilities are negatively related in a majority of the cases, pointing to the adverse effect of currency risk exposure on profitability. M2/GDP ratio coefficient is positive in majority of the cases pointing to greater profitability in more developed financial markets. Coefficients of the fundamental macroeconomic variables indicate a positive relationship between favorable macroeconomic conditions and bank performance. In this respect, banks make less profit when there is more inflation, budget deficit and current account deficit, and GDP growth in most cases increases profitability. Bank specific variables show that larger banks are more profitable and that the positive relationship between liquidity and profits is stronger for larger banks. Results also point to lower profitability for banks that carry higher levels of short term debt relative to the industry. Similar to the previous section, test statistics did not point to any serial correlation in the error term and Sargan-Hansen test confirmed the choice of the instruments.
I repeat the same experiment using the other 6 proxies for maturity mismatches. Summary of the results from these regressions including the whole sample, crisis periods and non crisis periods respectively are provided in Table 1 . The second column shows the proportion of regressions with a significant maturity mismatch coefficient, and the third column reports the proportion of significant coefficients which imply a negative causal relationship between maturity mismatches and profitability. There are two conflicting effects of maturity mismatches on profitability. First, banks that lend more short term and seek long term finance, profit less due to the insufficient amount of finance, and the low quality of loans to the private sector. However, these banks are more capable of avoiding liquidity, credit and currency risks. In particular, due to the long term maturity of their debt obligations and the short term maturity of their assets, these banks are able to cover liquidity shortages relatively quickly. When I consider the noncrisis periods only, I observe a negative relationship between maturity mismatches and profitability in majority of the cases. 20 This is due to the higher profitability of high maturity mismatch banks in the absence of crises and the fact that this effect dominates the higher profitability of low maturity mismatch banks during and in the aftermath of the financial crises. 21 This was especially true for larger banks. Next, I investigate the effects of pre-crisis maturity mismatches on profitability after the crisis. 
The low proportion of significant coefficients are due to the relatively small number of observations left after eliminating periods not corresponding to financial crises. Regressions using PTM, NPM, OM as dependent variables could not be run for the same reason. The main observation is that banks with more liquidity prior to the crisis profit relatively more after the crisis. More specifically, all the significant coefficients under the 1 year and 2 year after rows imply a negative relationship between maturity mismatches and profitability. Nonetheless, this relationship disappears after 3 years. I also find, consistent with Bleakley and Cowan (2005) and Gilchrist and Sim (2007) that maturity mismatches prior to a crisis do not affect investment afterwards.
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Checking for Hedging Behavior
The previous section provides some evidence for a negative relationship between maturity mismatches and profitability during crisis periods. In this section, I test whether banks stay more liquid in periods and countries that are characterized by high interest rate and exchange rate volatilities (characteristics of crisis periods). In this respect, I estimate the following regression equation using the same methods employed in the previous two sections.
where k it  corresponds to exchange rate and interest rate volatility. Maturity mismatch and the control variables are the same as discussed above, and I use 3 and 2 different measures of exchange rate and interest rate volatility respectively. There is no consensus in the literature about the use of trade weighted exchange rates. This rate is a good indicator of the exchange rate exposure of a country as a whole, but it is inappropriate when applied to every firm in the sample. 23 Since there is no consensus in theory as to which exchange rate is suitable for countries, I use the dollar, an equally weighted exchange rate consisting of the dollar, the yen and the euro, and a trade weighted exchange rate. Lending and deposit rates are employed to measure interest rate volatility. The literature motivates the distinction between the two rates by showing how the risk premium component of the interest rate spread increases as macroeconomic variables become more volatile. This in turn implies greater volatility in interest earnings of banks relative to their interest costs.
24 Volatility of interest rates and exchange rates are calculated by dividing standard deviation of monthly values by the annual averages. While exchange rates employed are monthly averages of national currency per dollar, yen or euro, interest rates are in percentages.
The results are summarized in Table 1 . The third and fourth columns show the proportion of significant coefficients indicating a positive relationship between price volatility and maturity mismatches for the liquidity variables and debt structure variables. 25 A majority of the significant coefficients point to a negative relationship between price volatility and maturity mismatches. This observation implies that banks choose not to or are incapable of hedging themselves against currency and interest rate risks by staying more liquid and borrowing more long term. Although price volatility was not as significant in determining maturity mismatches compared to capital inflows, the relationship suggests that banks become more illiquid and shift towards short term finance during periods of high price volatility. These results are in agreement with Bussiere, Fratzscher and Koeniger (2004) who find, using macroeconomic data that higher exchange rate volatility is associated with stronger maturity mismatches.
The breakdown of the significant coefficients under different dependent and independent variable definitions reveals that using a basket of currencies yields more significant coefficients.
26 Furthermore, lending rates seemed to have a more significant effect on the maturity mismatches of larger banks. This partially reflects the higher vulnerability of bank balance sheets to lending rate fluctuations, which is in turn consistent with increasing volatility of interest spreads during periods of high price volatility. The evidence supporting this behavior was stronger for larger banks and in non crisis periods. Larger banks are less risk averse and are more capable of borrowing during periods of macroeconomic instability, and passing these risks on to consumers, investors, government and smaller banks. During non crisis periods on the other hand, there is more strict regulation that restricts banks to hold more liquid assets and borrow long term. Although analyzing the validity of these claims is outside the scope of this paper, evidence reporting the inferior post crisis performance of banks with high maturity mismatches before crises is consistent with the latter argument.
A PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM FRAMEWORK
In this section, I extend the three period partial equilibrium model of Chang and Velasco (2001) and propose a convenient framework for studying the interaction of maturity mismatches and capital flows. This model is especially useful since general equilibrium models that are solved using different degrees of approximation are unable to capture the effects of large shocks economies face during financial crises.
Therefore, The economy consists of a bank, foreign creditors and consumers.
The bank is owned by the consumers. There are two types of consumers:  impatients and     1 patients. The impatient and patient consumers value consumption only in periods 1 and 2 respectively. Each consumer is born with an endowment of e. The price of consumption is fixed at one dollar. The bank can borrow from, and the consumers can invest in the international financial markets. One dollar invested in period zero yields one dollar in either period 1 or period 2.
The bank borrows d units from foreign creditors at t=0 and b units in period 1. The bank can finance a long term project at t=0 and collects R dollars per unit invested in period 2. This investment is denoted by k. If the long term investment is liquidated, bank collects r dollars per unit. The impatient and patient agents' consumption is denoted by x and y respectively. The bank maximizes a representative agent's utility denoted by:
Solution to the maximization problem yields the following allocations,
. Using these allocations, I define a maturity mismatch variable at the end of t=0,
. I assume that if there is a run on the bank every agent becomes impatient. Hence, the first term on the right hand side is the short term liabilities of the banking sector in the event of a bank run. The second term is the total liquidity the bank would have in period 1 provided that foreign creditors do not renege on their promise to provide short term financing.
is the amount of maximum liquidation that leaves the bank with enough resources to pay back its foreign debt in period 2.
If we substitute in the expressions for w and  , and notice that the foreign finance and the capital financing constraints equations (6) and (9) bind in equilibrium, it is straightforward to measure the effect of capital flows on maturity mismatches.
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Taking derivatives with respect to short term and long term foreign lending one can show that,
Since 1   and b <1, short term capital flows, b decrease maturity mismatches if foreign lenders continue to lend in the event of a bank run. However, the second term on the right hand side of equation (12) would be R r / with a positive coefficient if ongoing lending was halted.
28 Therefore, the presence of short term capital in the country would increase maturity mismatches if there is a capital reversal. One can also show that higher values of R ,  and  increase the amount allocated to impatient agents and increase the proportion of short term liabilities, and increase the sensitivity of maturity mismatches to short term capital flows. If  is higher, banks gives more weight to maximizing the utility of the impatient agents, and if there is higher risk aversion,  , patient agents that consume at the high productivity period cross-subsidize the impatient agents to a greater extent. The effect of the return on long term projects, R on equation (13) is ambiguous since it increases the economy's wealth and the cost of liquidation simultaneously.
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Long term capital flows have two opposing effects on maturity mismatches. On the one hand, they increase the economy's wealth similar to short term flows, and increase short term liabilities. On the other hand, they increase the amount of return in period 2 that can be liquidated. Therefore, the net effect cannot be determined without specifying parameter values. Nevertheless, if we consider the range of values for  used by the literature, the effect is negative if the proportion of impatient agents is roughly less than liquidation costs. 30 Overall, the predictions of the model agree with empirical evidence and support a positive relationship between maturity mismatches and capital flows.
Empirical findings in the previous section pointed to a negative relationship between profits and maturity mismatches when there is a financial crisis. To investigate whether the model can replicate this result, I define the liquidity shortage of the banking sector and maturity mismatches in the model economy, and measure the relationship between the two when there are capital reversals.
The risk neutral banks do not make profits, and have just enough funds to pay back foreign debt and domestic agents when there is no crisis. Therefore, the change in profits is equal to the losses incurred or equivalently the liquidity shortage in period 1. I assume that in the event of a crisis, short term foreign funds are not received, and 0  b . Furthermore, since banks liquidate long term funds to pay impatient agents, they are unable to meet the deposit demands of patient agents. Hence, patient agents withdraw their funds in the first period, and receive x. I investigate three cases corresponding to the behavior of long term creditors and the banking sector. where wc represents the withdrawal costs. Based on the assumption that every agent becomes impatient during a crisis, maturity mismatches prior to a capital reversal can be defined as the difference between maximum level of liabilities in period 1 and potential funds from liquidation. Evidently, this definition leads to a negative relationship between maturity mismatches and every definition of profitability. Nevertheless, the maturity mismatch variables I included in my empirical analysis are constructed using actual levels of liabilities before a crisis, and not potential levels of liabilities. Thus, the definition of maturity mismatches that fits its empirical counterpart is,
Given this setup, it is straight forward to obtain the relationship between maturity mismatches and losses. Table 6 shows the sings of the partial derivatives dMM d i /  .  , MM and i represent the losses, maturity mismatches, and the three different scenarios. 31 The most important observation is that parameters and exogenous variables that increase (decrease) maturity mismatches also increase (decrease) the losses incurred for most of the cases. More specifically, the negative signs (except for 2 cases) in the last three rows of Table 6 imply opposing effects of model parameters --column values --on maturity mismatches prior the crisis and on losses following the crisis. Hence, one can attribute the disparity between the profitability of high and low maturity banks following a crisis to the different variables and parameters these banks face. In particular, the proportion of impatient customers they have, the amount of short term and long term foreign funds they attract, the relative risk aversion of their customers, the type of projects they finance, and the relative ease in which they can convert long term assets into short term assets determines their maturity mismatches and the losses they incur when there are capital reversals.
The first three rows of the first column show that as return on long term investments increase the overall wealth in the economy increases and banks promise a larger amount to impatient agents. Hence, following a crisis when patient agents also withdraw x, losses are amplified. Maturity mismatches increase as liabilities in the first period increase due to a rise in x. In contrast, higher liquidation costs--lower r --increases losses and maturity mismatches.
If long term foreign credit, d is high prior to a crisis, losses increase when banks honor their long term debt, since they cannot liquidate d and more x is promised as high levels of d correspond to higher wealth. If long term debt is not paid back, banks can liquidate d, but since x increases simultaneously the effect on profits is ambiguous.
Nevertheless, for reasonable values of  and R, the effect was positive. When foreign creditors withdraw their long term credits prematurely, the effect of an increase in d is ambiguous. Nevertheless, if foreign liquidation costs are equal to domestic liquidation costs, the effect on profits was negative. The effect on maturity mismatches is ambiguous as the availability of more resources to liquidate is counteracted by the higher levels of x. Overall, the relationship between losses and maturity mismatches generated by shocks to d is not clear. In contrast, short term finance, b unambiguously generates a positive relationship as it increases wealth but does not provide potential liquidity in period 1.
The effect of higher endowments increases losses under all three scenarios since, the effect of higher wealth --and more x --dominates the higher levels of potential liquidity. However, the effects on maturity mismatches are not clear and thus, the relationship between losses and maturity mismatches is ambiguous.
An increase in  and  both decrease profits and increase maturity mismatches as the number of impatient agents and the amount of cross subsidization that accompanies higher risk aversion leads to lower liquidity to meet the higher amounts promised to impatient agents.
To summarize, the model --consistent with empirical evidence --points to a positive relationship between maturity mismatches and losses incurred after a crisis.
CONCLUSION
This paper investigates the significance of maturity mismatches for emerging market banking sectors that have been associated with severe financial crisis. The main finding is that bank balance sheets exhibit higher levels of maturity mismatches during capital inflows and that these mismatches generate higher profits (losses) when there is financial stability (a capital reversal). Therefore, the results imply that banks face a tradeoff between hedging against possible liquidity shortages, and increasing their profitability. The positive maturity mismatches-capital flows and maturity mismatch-price volatility relationships found in the paper provide support for the argument that profit motives dominate precautionary motives.
These results have policy implications: Maturity mismatches in the financial sector should be under close supervision just like currency mismatches. In this respect, preliminary results showing the significant effects of maturity mismatches that are not necessarily due to currency mismatches provide further justification. Furthermore, the predictions of a partial equilibrium bank-run model imply that regulatory authorities should closely monitor idiosyncrasies in the industry. More specifically, types of customers banks serve, the relative risk aversion of these customers, the external debt composition, the type of projects they finance, and the relative ease in which they can convert long term assets into short term assets are important determinants of the financial sectors' health.
This analysis does not thoroughly take account of the interaction between currency mismatches and maturity mismatches at the entity level, since data on foreign liabilities and assets and their maturities at the individual bank level are not available. It would be interesting for further research to measure how much of the deterioration in the debt structure of the banking sector is due to exchange rate and interest rate fluctuations, and to model the interactions between interest rate and exchange rate associated risks. Modeling the effects of maturity mismatches that allows for these interactions would require a general equilibrium framework.
APPENDIX A
A.1 Banking Sector Variables Liquidity and Debt Management
Quick Ratio: A measure of a company's liquidity, used to evaluate creditworthiness. Equals quick assets divided by current liabilities. Quick Assets: Cash and other assets which can or will be converted into cash fairly soon, such as accounts receivable and marketable securities; or equivalently, current assets minus inventory. Current Ratio: Current assets divided by current liabilities. An indication of a company's ability to meet short-term debt obligations; the higher the ratio, the more liquid the company is. Current Assets: A balance sheet item which equals the sum of cash and cash equivalents, accounts receivable, inventory, marketable securities, prepaid expenses, and other assets that could be converted to cash in less than one year. A company's creditors will often be interested in how much that company has in current assets, since these assets can be easily liquidated in case the company goes bankrupt. Current Liabilities: A balance sheet item which equals the sum of all money owed by a company and due within one year. Current Ratio (Balance sheet): Current ratio defined above is reported separately by mergent online. For some banks and time periods although balance sheet items are reported ratios, corresponding ratios are missing. Therefore current ratio variable based on the balance sheet values is created. Current Ratio (Balance sheet + Ratio): This ratio is constructed to check robustness. Current liabilities are obtained by multiplying Current Liabilities/Equity ratio with Equity value from the balance sheet. This variable in turn is divided by current assets to determine the current ratio. Short term debt: Loans and obligations with a maturity of less than one year. Short term debt / Assets: Short term debt is as follows. First total debt to equity is multiplied with equity to obtain total debt. Second long term debt to assets ratio is multiplied with assets to obtain long term debt. Finally short term debt is found by subtracting long term debt from total debt. Long term debt / Assets: This ratio is reported directly by Mergentonline and represents the ratio of loans and obligations with a maturity of more than one year and total assets. Profitability Return on Equity: A measure of how well a company used reinvested earnings to generate additional earnings, equal to a fiscal year's after-tax income (after preferred stock dividends but before common stock dividends) divided by book value, expressed as a percentage. It is used as a general indication of the company's efficiency; in other words, how much profit it is able to generate given the resources provided by its stockholders. Return on Assets: A measure of a company's profitability, equal to a fiscal year's earnings divided by its total assets, expressed as a percentage. Return on Investment: Equal to a fiscal year's income divided by common stock and preferred stock equity plus long-term debt. Gross Margin: Gross income divided by net sales, expressed as a percentage. Pre-Tax Margin: Net profit before taxes divided by net sales. Net Profit Margin: Net profit divided by net revenues, often expressed as a percentage. This number is an indication of how effective a company is at cost control. Operating Margin: Operating income divided by revenues, expressed as a percentage.
A.2. Capital Flow Variables
Net Portfolio Investment Position: The stock of the difference between portfolio investment liabilities and assets reported in the balance of payments accounts. It reflects not only the sum of balance of payments transactions over time, but also price changes, exchange rate changes, and other adjustments. The item includes transactions with nonresidents in financial securities of any maturity (such as corporate securities, bonds, notes, and money market instruments) other than those included in direct investment, exceptional financing, and reserve assets. Net Direct Investment: Equity capital and reinvested earnings. Direct investments in the republic net of direct investments abroad. BOP Net Debt Liabilities: Covers bonds, debentures, notes, etc., and money market or negotiable debt instruments. BOP Net Equity Liabilities: Includes shares, stocks, participation, and similar documents that usually denote ownership of equity. 
APPENDIX B
APPENDIX C. PARTIAL DERIVATIVES (Effect of capital return on profits)
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ENDNOTES
(*) I thank the participants at the 2007 WEAI conference, Christian Zimmerman and Melanie Guldi for helpful comments and discussions. 1 See IMF Global Financial Stability Report April, 2007 for a discussion on the limited effect that the May-June 2006 turbulence had in emerging market economies partially due to strong public and private balance sheets. 2 See IMF World Economic Outlook October, 2008 for a discussion on the negative effects of capital reversals on balance sheets, especially for countries (c.f. Baltic countries) that had high levels of foreign borrowing prior to the financial crisis. 3 Similarly, Valev (2006) investigates the relationship between economic volatility and the term structure of U.S. bank credit to emerging markets using bank level data. In this paper, I measure the effect of economic uncertainty on maturity mismatches of domestic banks instead of foreign lenders. 4 For example, Chari, Kehoe McGrattan (2005) find, counterintuitively, an increase in output following a capital reversal. 5 The model is similar to the partial equilibrium bank run framework of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) where bank runs lead to immature liquidation of long term investments and increase output volatility. Chang and Velasco (2001) apply this framework to show how foreign currency denominated debt coupled with capital reversals increase the probability of a financial crisis. 6 Refer to Table B.1. in Appendix B. Country debt ratios in this table are weighted averages of individual bank ratios. Weights are banks' total assets. Non-weighted measures yielded similar figures. 7 Except for Argentina and Korea weighted ratios are higher than the figures under the IMF column. The difference between the two sectors is more evident in advanced economies. 8 In general, there is an increase (a decrease) in the ratios prior to (following) the Asian, Brazilian, Russian and Argentina, Turkey crisis episodes. 9 We can also see that, Korean and Malaysian banks have acquired more long term debt in the last three years, reflecting the tightening in bank regulation and the process of deleveraging in these countries. 10 Evidence is provided in Table B .2. of Appendix B. Quick ratio is used as a proxy for maturity mismatches. Quick Ratio is defined in Appendix A. The quick ratios in the table are the simple averages of the ratios of the banks. 11 Refer to Table B .3. of Appendix B for details. In the table, the Short Term Debt/Current Assets ratio is used as a proxy for maturity mismatches, and the effects of these mismatches are measured by the average rate of return on equity and assets. Banks in each country are divided into groups depending on the level of their maturity mismatches. Banks with ratios greater than the median ratio are classified as high maturity mismatch (MM) group and as low MM otherwise. 12 For example, Argentina has the greatest interest rate volatility and has stayed more liquid than any other country. However, although Turkey has more price volatility, it has remained less liquid compared to Korea. Table B .4. of Appendix B reports the price volatilities along with the weighted and non weighted quick ratios of the banks. 13 For instance, average total assets (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) , deflated using the CPI) of the largest 3 banks in Argentina, Korea and Turkey were respectively, 66.7,37.8 and 51.6 times the average total assets of the smallest 3 banks. There was similar discrepancy in other countries and in the profitability, debt structure and liquidity ratios. 14 Diamond (1997), Jacklin (1987) , and Chang and Velasco (2001) argue that if equity and bond markets are deep then there is no role for the banking sector and the market can replicate all that banks can do. Hence, if capital flows are mostly in terms of debt and equity flows it should have relatively small effects on bank maturity mismatches. I include these variables to account for the growing depth of the financial markets in these countries. See Reisen and Soto (2001), Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart (1996) for the different properties of equity and debt flows in terms of their effect on growth and their relative tendency to flow out of the country during financial turbulences. 15 See Kant (1996) for a discussion on the effect of direct investment on capital flight. The author also argues that direct investment has increased in terms of the relative share of capital inflows in developing countries. 16 These numbers imply that a significant drop in US interest rates may push the already high ratio of banking sector leverage to critical levels. A 1 percent increase in the net portfolio investment position / GDP ratio leads to a 3.42 percent drop in the quick ratio. 17 There is evidence showing that direct investment during financial crisis may be flowing in to the country instead of flowing out. This type of direct investment in the form of (M&A) seeks to take advantage of the liquidity problems of domestic firms. See Bleakley and Cowan (2005) . 18 It can be seen from the table that liquidity ratios have a non trivial effect on profitability. For instance, a 1 percent increase in the quick ratio corresponds to a 2.26 percent increase in the return on equity. 19 If a bank has a foreign currency open position, a depreciation of the currency will increase its short term liabilities and have no effect on its assets. In Table 4 , a one percent depreciation of the currency leads to a 0.19 percent drop in ROE. The coefficients of the exchange rate were similar in other experiments. 20 The signs of rows 1,2,3,4,7 and 5,6 are expected to be positive and negative respectively if profitability is affected negatively from maturity mismatches. 21 There are 16 crisis periods in the sample: Argentina (02), Brazil (91, 99), Colombia( 95, 97, 98, 99) , Korea(97), Malaysia (97, 98), Mexico(94), Philippines(97), Turkey(94, 01), Venezuela(94, 95) . 22 Investment is equal to the sum of the changes in investments and advances, loans and lease financing, gross property, plant and equipment, intangible asset items in the balance sheets. This definition of investment is different from that of Bleakley and Cowan (2005) since I am analyzing the financial sector. 23 Dominquez and Tesar (2006) show that trade weighted exchange rates can lead to an under estimation of foreign exchange exposure. 24 See Saunders and Schumacher (2000) . 25 The coefficients of the control variables and the test statistics are similar to those in Table 3 . Therefore, they are not reported. 26 This result contradicts Dominguez and Tesar (2006), and Allayannis and Ofek (2001) . The former finds that trade weighted exchange rates understate exposure. The latter finds no significant difference between using individual and basket of exchange rates. The discrepancy maybe due to the fact that I consider financial institutions that are more likely to have exposure to a basket of currencies than the non-financial sector that is considered in the aforementioned research. Table  B .5. in Appendix B summarizes the results. 27 Equations (6) and (9) bind in equilibrium since return on domestic long term investment is higher than the return on the international asset, and the bank borrows as much as it can to maximize the representative agent's utility. Maturity mismatches are given by:
28 b=0 in the second term of (11), although the allocation represented in the first term does not change. 29 When there are lower liquidation costs short term capital inflows lead to a greater increase in maturity mismatches as equation (12) is positively related to r. 30 Bernanke, Gertler, Gilchrist (1999) assume that bankruptcy costs are 12% of banks assets. If this parameter value is used then the effect of long term inflows on maturity mismatches are negative only if the proportion of impatient agents are less than roughly 88%. I could not find a parameter value for the latter in the literature. 31 The expressions for the partial derivatives are provided in Appendix C. 
